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This paper points out some of the peculiarities that may arise not in the problema[ic
ancl widely dealt with classical social choice context, but in the context of collective decision
making in a team - a group of individuals who share the same interest but often possess
differrnt dr~isional skilts. Employing the simple symmetric version of the uncertain,
indcpendcnt, dichutumuus chuicr framewurk, wc present a series of propositions about the
sumewhat unexpected violation of variuus forms of independence, monotonicity and
symmetry prolxrties.1. Introduction
Numerous studies have been concerned with various aspects of the social choice
problematics. To this day there remains considerable disagreement on the appropriate
method for selecting an alternative when the social choice is based on heterogeneous
hrricrrn.rs. Imp~~asibilhy Ihr~~rrms :~huund :md Ihc shortcomings of altcmatívc coll~tive
decision rules hav~ often been demonstrated by showing that their use results in paradoxes.
'I'he purpuu~ ot the currcnt paper is to complemcnt this literature by pointing out some of the
peculiarities - results that seem opposed to common sense or intuition (at least at first glance)
- that may arise not in the problematic social choice context, but in the unproblematic'
context of collective decision making in a team - a group of individuals (board of directors,
committee or a panel of experts, court, jury) who share the same interest (preferences,
objective function) but often possess different decisional skills. Employing a simple
symmetric version of the uncertain, independent, dichotomous choice framework, we present
a series of propositions about the somewhat unexpected violation of various forms of
independence, monotonicity and symmetry properties. Some of these propositions
(peculiarities) are reported without their proofs as these can be found in other works of one
or the two of us. Most of the results, however, are novel. Their proofs are relatively non-
technical and in some cases based on straighforward examples.
In the uncertain symmetric pairwise choice setting which is presented in the following
section there always exists an optimal decision rule for the group. The optimal rule turns
out to be a weighted majority rule, Nitzan and Paroush (1982), (1985), Shapley and Grofman
(1984). The set of potentially optimal decision rules coincides therefore with the set of
potentially optimal weighted majority rules.
The individual's optimal weight depends solely on his decisional skill. Nevertheless,
his actual essentiality in the collective decision-making process does depend on the decisional2
skills and, in turn, on the optimal weights assigned to the other group members.
[nterdependence among individual effectivity levels is discussed in Section 3.
The uptimal rule is determined by the group members' decisional skills. In Section
4 we discuss three types of monotonicity: monotonicity of the desirable extent of participation
in group decision making with respect to inequality in the distribution of decisional skills;
monotonicity of the individual's marginal effectivity on group performance with respect to
his ranking in terms of decisional skills and monotonicity of group performance with respect
to group size.
In our symmetric setting it seems plausible to expect that there are no "special" rules
or "special" subsets of rules among the potentially optimal rules. in Section 5 we show that
some rules :u-c "slxci:tl". 'I'hc asymmetry among rules is manifested by the "specialness" of
some ut thcm. Anuthcr peculiarity which is discussed in Ihis section is the fact that
asymmetry is also manifested among rankings of rules. The last section contains a brief
summary.
2. The framework and some basic results~
Consider a group of individuals N- { 1,...,n} that has to choose one of two mutually
exclusive alternatives, a or b. The individual preferences are identical, however, their
indepcndent judgemcnts concerning the alternative that ought to be chosen, the alternative
that better suits their common objective, may differ. The decisional skill of individual t is
repre.uunted by his probability p. of choosing the correct alternative. With no loss of
generality, it is assumed that p. 2 o.g and that i ~ j implies p~ 2 p~. The decisional quality
of thc group, namely its probability of making a correct decision, n, depends on the
collective decision ntle it applies. Such a rule is a function f from the set of individual3
decisions ~-1,1~" to the set of collective decisions ~-1,1) where -1 and 1 represent,
respectively, decisions in favor of alternative a and altemative b. An element in the domain
of the function f is an n-tuple of individual decisions or a decision pmfile
z-(x~,...,z" ), x~E (-1,1 ~. The set of all possible decision rules is denoted p. The
number ofdecision rules in F, ~F~, LS 2r. The optimal decision rule f corresponding top




The solution of this problem, Nitzan and Paroush ( 1982), Shapley and Grofman (1984), is
given by a weighted majority nile (WM~ with individual weights that are equal to the
logarithms uf the individual odds uf making a correct choice. That is
"
j'(p) - sign (E w,x; )
;-i
(2)
wtiere x, -(n p' . Note that any WMR can be defined by a normalized system of
' (1 - p;)
wcights (w~,..,,w") such that individual weights are non-negative integers and the sum of the
weights is minimal. An individual is called inessential if his normalized weight is zero. The
number of essential decision makers corresponding to j' represents the optimal extent of
participation in the group decision making and is denoted by ,~. The WMR defined by the
assignment of equal weight to the k most competent individuals, k being odd, and zero
weight to the remaining individuals is called a restricted majority rule (RM~ of order k.
The RMR of order l is the widely used expert rule. The RMR of order n is the common
simple majority rule (SMR).
The proof of all the propositions (peculiarities) presented in this paper are based on
the optimality condition (2) ur on one of its following three corollaries: The necessary and4
sufticient conditions for the optimality of
(a) the expert rule,
(b) the SMR,
(rl Ihr uthcr K.biR~s.
are given, respectively, by (see Nitzan and Paroush (1982), (1984b) and Gradstein (1986))
(3a), (3b), (3c).
n
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Table 1(ser Fishburn and Gehrlein (1977) and Nitzan and Paroush ( 1981)) lists all
potentially optimal WMR's in n-member groups, n s 5.
Talile 1: Potentially optimal WMR's in n-member groups, n s 5.
n 1 2 3 4 5
WMR's ( l) (l,0) (1,0,0) (1,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0,0)
represented by the ( 1,1,1) (1,1,1,0) (1,1,1,0,0)





Table 2(.rce Fishburn and Gehrlein (1977), Nitzan and Paroush ( 1981) and Isbell
(1959)) presents the number of all possible collective decision rules, potentially optimal
WMR~s and potentially optimal RMR~s for n-member groups, n s 8.
"1':~ble 2: Number uf polentially optimal RMR~s, ~ RMR' ~, potentially optimal WMR~s,
~WMR' ~ and collective decision rules, ~ F ~, for n-member groups, n s 8.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
~ RMR' ~ I l 2 2 3 3 4 4
~ WMR' ~ I 1 ~ 3 7 2l 135 2470
~ F ~ 4 16 256 2" 21z 2~ 21za 2zsn
3. Interdependence
3.1 The effect ol' eliminatin~, a decision maker on the essentiality of other decision
~nakcn
In our pairwise choice model decisions are independent. The optimal decision rule (2)
entails that each individual's optimal weight is independent of the number and skills of the
other decision makers; it depends just on his own decisional skill. However, the optimal
decisional essentiality of the individual strongly depends on the skills and, in turn, on the
optimal weights of the other members. The following three simple examples illustrate one
aspect of this interdependence, namely, the possible decisive effect of eliminating from the
group one of its members on the essentiality of more skilled or less skilled members.6
Example 3.1: Consider the five-member group where p -(0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.~. By (2),
the best rule is defined by the weights (3,2,2,1,1), so every individual is essential, k- 5.
Suppose that individual 2 is excluded from the group. In the reduced four-member group
p~-(0.9, 0.7, 0.6, 0.6). By (3a), the expert rule is the optimal rule ,~ - 1. The example
rlrarly illustr;~trs thal Ihcrc arr raxrs whrrr thc~ cssrnliality uf Icss cnmtxtent individuals is
due to the presence of more competent ones.
Example 3.2: Consider the four-member group where p-(0.95, 0.8, 0.8, O.tí) - By (2),
the optimal rule is a simple majority rule with a tie-breaking chairman. So all decision
makers are essential. Suppose that individual 4 is excluded from the group. In the reduced
three-member group p~-(0.95, 0.8, 0.8) and, by (3a), the expert rule becomes the optimal
rule. This example illustrates that there are cases where the essentiality of more competent
members (in the example, individuals 2 and 3) is due to the presence of less competen[ ones.
Example 3.3: Consider the four-member group where p-(0.9, 0.8, 0.7, O.tí). By (2), the
optimal rule is a simple majority rule with a tie-breaking chairman. So all members are
essential. It can be veritied that the elimination of individual 2 makes individual 3 inessential
and the elimination of individual 3 makes individual Z inessential (in both cases the expert
rule becomes the optimal rule in the reduced group). Hence, sometimes in the same group
the essentiality of some member is due to the presence of less competent members and the
essentiality of another member is due to the presence of more competent members.
To sum up,~
(P.1) The esscntiality of a decision maker may be due to the presence of more competent or
less competent decision makers in the group.
3.2 Path dependeuce
1"hr at,pli~ati~m i,f SMR within a committce, namely the use of a RMR. is very
wntmun. Often the commíttee is chosen sequentially. A single decision maker is assigned
essentiality and then in each subsequent stage a decision is made on whether a given
candidate pair of Jecision makers should be added to the committee. The question is whether
the selection oF a committee in such a manner is path dependent (depending on the order the
candidatc pairs of decision makers are introduced for consideration). If a certain pair is
rcje~lyd din~s it m:~kr srnsr tu rrconsiclcr its inclusion in thc cominittec at a later stage? If
a certain pair is admitted to the committee dces it make sense at a later stage to consider its
elimination? The answer to all these questions is positive, which is another aspect of the
interdependence among individual optimal weights. This is illustrated in the example below.
[;xample 3.a: Suppuse that inclividual 1 is assigned essentiality where pi - p.g. There are
three candidate pairs to joining the committee, A B and C. Their respective decisional
skills arc p" -(p.75, 0.65), P" -(0.9, 0.9) and pc -(0.8, 0.8). At any stage a
candidate pair is aclcled to the ~n-member committee if
P.,.i Pm.z
the probability to obtain a minimal majority in favor of
the correct alternative in the m-member committee.
~
(1 - p,~,~) (1 - pT,,) the probability to obtain a minimal majority in favor of
the incorcect alternative in the m-member committee.
(for a proof sc~e Karotkin (1992a)). Applying this criterion, when the pair A is considered
first, it is added to the one-member committee ( I(. If pair B is considered in the next8
slage, it is added to the cxisting three-member committee. If the first decision regarding A
can be reconsidered after the second decision has been made, the pair A will be eliminated
from the ti~~e-member cummittee ~ 11 F U A U B~ - Given the committee ~(1 ~ U B} the pair
C is cunsidered and added. If at this stage the pair A is given another chance it will be
:~d~lyd. ~Vhrn il~cisiuns arc inwcrsiblc and thc candidate pairs to join the cummittee are
introdurcd in lhe ~~rdrr A. g .(', all pain will be admítted to the committee. If the order
the candidate pairs are introduced is B- A - C. only B and C will be admi[ted. This
makes clcar that
(P.21 A cummittee applying a SMR which is obtained by using the sequential pair-selection
process is path dependent.
4. Monotonicity'?
J.1 Is the extent of pailicipation in group decision making inversely related to the
divc~~sily in decisiunal skills'
If dreisiunal skills :tre sufticiently heterogeneous such that condition (3a) is satisfied, the
optimal number of essential decision makers is minimal, k- 1, the expert rule being the
optimal WMR. In a homogeneous group the optimal number of essential decision makers
is maximal, ,~ - n, since by condition (3b) the SMR is the optimal WMR. A decrease in
the decisiunal skill of the most competent decision maker clearly reduces the diversity in the
distribution of decisional skills. A transfer of decisional skill from individual i to the less
competent individual j, i ~ j, also seems to reduce the diversity in decisional skills.
It seems plausible to expect that k is inversely related to the diversity in decisional
skills. ~'he following examples clarify that such a relationship dces no[ necessarily exist.9
Gxample J.l: Let ~~ - 5 and p-(0.97, 0.80, 0.80,0.65, 0.60). By (2), the optimal rule
is the WMR detined by the weights w-(3,1,1,1,1) ~d k~ 5. Now suppose that the
decisional skill of individual t declines to p.gg and in turn
p~ -(0.85, 0.80,0.80, 0.65, O.óO). By (3c), the optimal rule now changes to the RMR of
order 3, k- 3, so under the more egalitarian distribution of decisional skills the op[imal
number of essential decision makers declines.
Example 4.2: Let n- 3 and p-(0.95, 0.90, 0.70) - By (2), the optimal rule in this case
is thc SMR. k- 3. Now consider the rank-preserving equalization of decisional skills
transfonning p to p' -(0.95, O.RO, 0.80). By (2), the optimal rule now changes to the
expert rule, ,t: - 1. Under the more egalitarian distribution of decisional skills the number
of essential decision makers declines.
To sum up, more egalitarian decisional skilis and, in turn, more egalitarian optimal
weights do not nccessarily result in more egalitarian normalized weights. That is,
(P.3) The optimal number of essential decision makers dces not necessarily increase when
the distributiun of decisional skills becomes more egalitarian.
An elitistic type of change in the structure of group decision making can be thus
eliminated and justly rationalized by an egalitarian type of change in the distribution of
decisional skills.lo
4.2 Is the individual's marginal effect on group perfotmance declining with his relative
ranking by decisional skill?
Ry (2), the dcrisional effectivity of an individual is positively related to his decisional
yu:dity. 'l'hr m:ugin:d effcct uf the individual's decisional skill on group performance
`~n~)) is pusitivc and declining. The question now is how dces the individual's marginal
dn,
effect on group performance relate to his relative tanking by skill. Is ~ 'th marginal
contribution to the group decisional quality lower than that of j when i c j (member i is
more competent than member j)? Karotkin and Nitzan (1992b) have recently proved that
this is not the case.
(P.4) If inember t is more competent than member j, i's marginal effect on the decisional
quality of the group is higher than or equal to that of inember j.
This tinding has signiticant economic and ethical implications. For example, suppose that
the group ran afford sending just one member to a decision-making workshop that supposedly
increases the decisional capability of the panicipants. If the marginal contribution of such
a workshop to the individual decisional skill is identical for all individuals, then (P.4) implies
that the most competen[ member should be sent to the workshop. The economically
warrantcd Iwlícy uf investmcnt in human capital is not egalitarian - increasing the gap
between the most competent member and the other members is desirable. Individual
decisional skills can, of course, be related to income. In such a case, (P.4) may clearly
justify an unequal income distribution generating unequal distribution of decisional skills that
enhances efficiency, i.e., increases the quality of collective decision making (see Kolm
(1990) for other examples of just unequal treatment of equals).11
4.3 Are two or more better than one~
If all individuals share the same decisional skill p, the quality of a collective decision
based on the decisiuns uf twu individuals is equal to the quality of a decision based on the
decisiunal skill ofjust one of them (p2 r p(1 - p)0.5 t (1 - p)p0.5 - p). In other words,
two equally skilled, valuable (p ~ 0.5) decision makers are not better than one who solely
determines the group decision. Two are also not better than one when they are added to a
group consisting of an even number of inembers. Reinforcing the group by one or two
individuals has the same etfect on the performance of the group. However, two are better
than one when they are added to an n-member group, n being odd, since such an addition
impruves the decisional quality of the group whereas the addition ofjust one of them has no
effect on its perfurmance. The above observations imply that, when n- 1, the substitution
of' the sing,le decision maker with two even slightly less qualified decision makers is
dctrimcntal tu the group perfonnancc. "1'his latter assertion is also tnie for any homogeneous
group with an odd number of inembers." When n is even, the substitution of an individual
in an n-member group with two less competent ones can be beneficial. Finally note that in
a homogcncous pupulation, three or more individuals are always better than one. This is due
to the Iact that, by (Z), when individuals are equally skilled the SMR is optimal. In general,
expansions of a group (reinforcement with valuable individuals) can be neutral, tha[ is, have
no ~ffrct un the prrfurmancc of the group. The conditions ensuring such neutrality are
providcd in Karulkin and Nitzan (1992a).' "I'u swn up,
(P.5) Twu equally skilled valuable individuals are not better than one. Three or more are
better than one. In general, reinforcement of a group with valuable members need not
increase its performance.12
s. ~.,ytt,tt,E.rr.y
j,l Are ihere "speci:,l" WMR's~'
R~ t'l, r~rrv {{~h~R ~an br ~~ptimal, i.c., therc exist contigurations of decisional skills
under whirh it is the best rule. In contrast, not every WMR can be the worst selection for
the group, i.e., there exist WMR's that never yield the lowest probability of a correct
collective d~cision. More specifically, it has been recently shown, Karotkin (1992b), that
the set of RMR's is special since
(P.6) fur any givcn distribution uf decisional skills (pi,,.,~pn ), the worst rule among the
potentially optimal WMR's is always a RMR.
The number of RMR's is relatively very small in comparison to the number of WMR~s. For
example, in a seven-member group there are l35 WMR~s but only four RyR~s (see Table
2). "1"he cummon application of simple majority within a committee (a subset of the group)
thus involves cunsiderablc risk. Even a seemingly insignificant change in the number of
cummittce members nr.ry imply a move from the best to the worst WMR and in any event
would be associated with a high likelihood of resulting in the worst rule.
Any doubt regarcling the individual decisional skills clearly casts doubt on the rule
selected for aggregating the group members' decisions. Suppose now that the actual
decisions ofthe group members have been revealed." The question arises whether one should
still be disturbed by such a doubt. The answer to this question is negative if the collective
decision is invariant to the WMR applied by the group, that is, if all W]{~R~s result in the
same collective choice. It turns out that the set of RMR~s also has the following distinetive
and useful diagnostic feature:13
(P.~ For any given decision profile x-(xt,...,xn ), the collective choice is invariant to
WMR selection if it is invariant to RMR selection.
Tu príivc (P.~, suppuse that given the decision protile x-(xt,...,xn ) all RyR~s result
in the same collcctivc decision, say alternative b. We need to show that alternative 6 is also
selectcd by any uther putentially optimal WMR, j`~, which is detined by the weights
wo - (wo,...,wo )-
Sincc the RMR uf order I selects alternative b, xi - 1. Since the RMR oforder 3 also
selects b, it must be the case that either x, or x~ (or both) is (are) equal to l. Similarly,
by assumption, x~ or x5 must equal 1, etc. If n is odd, either xn-1 or xn must equal 1. Ifn
is even, either xn ~ or x~ 1 must equal 1.
For an odd n ,
~ WoXi -(wl~xl
. W2x2) t(Wlx7 ; W4x4 ) t...t (wn-2xn-2 t Wn-~xn-1 ) t Wnxn .
i-I
Now even if x, --1 and x, - 1, x6 --1 and xs - 1, ... and xn-i --1 and xn - 1, the
terms in brackets and the last term are non-negative and, therefore, ~ woxi z 0- One can
i-
rcadily vcrify that in all uther pussiblc cases E woxi is also non-negative.
i-i
~or an cven n ,
E w;'xi -(WiXi . w2x2 ) t(wox3 t w4x4 ) t...t (W~-3xn-3 t w~-~n-2 ) t
i-1
(Wn-~xn-~ t wnxn ) '
Now even if x2 --1 and x, - I, x, --1 and xs - 1, ... and xn-Z --1, xn-t - 1 and
n
x--1 , each of the terms in brackets is non-negative and therefore, E woxi 2 0. The
n i~l
same result is obtained in all other possible cases. We have thus obtained that for any
jo e ~ WMR ' ~ , f(x) - 1.14
Since the number of R~yR~s is relatively very small, (P.~ provides us with a useful test
I~~r ihrróiiq~, whrthir, p.iccn Ihr inliirm:Hiim :Ihiwt Ihc artual individn:~l dccixions, lhc
pruhlem of xlrrung thc appropriate WMR is incunsequential. Obviously, when the decision
protile is unanimous, the collective decision is invariant to the WMR selection. The
following example illustrates a non-trivial situation where all WMR~s lead to the same
uutcome.
Example 5.L Let ~- 7 and x-(-1,1,-1,-1,1,1,-1). So four members choose alternative
~ and the remaining three select alternative b. To check whether all 135 possible WMR~s
result in the same collective decision, one needs to check the collective decision applying just
the four pussible RM(t~s of order 1,3,5 and 7. The fact that
ft(x) - f3(x) - fs(x) - f7(x) --1 is sufficient to determine the invariance of collective
dccisiun lo thc WMR srlcrtcd by the graup.
When the cullectivc choice is not invariant to rule selection, it is possible that, given the
decisional skills p and the decision profile x, the group applies an unfortunate WMR that
results in an incorrect decision whereas ull other efficient WMR~s' yield the correct collective
decision. Such an unfortunate ntle f must belong to the set of RMR~s. For supposethatfg~RMR}
and that f(x) results in a collective choice which is different than the one obtained by all
other potentially optimal WMR~s. This implies that all RyR~s select the same alternative.
By (P.~, all potentially optimal WMR~s including f select the same alterna[ive. We obtain
a contradiction, which proves thatIS
(P.8) Given a decision protile x-(x~~...,Xn ), an efficient WMR f can result in a choice
which is different than the choice obtained by all other efficient WMR~s, if and only iff is
.i R.tiIK.
Example SZ: Let n- ~ and x-(1,1,-1,-1,-1,1,1).. In this case the RMR of order 5 is
the only rule resulting in a decision which is different than the one obtained by any of the
other l34 potentially optimal WMR~s.
An intcresting and useful property of' the RMR of order n, namely the SMR is the
robustness of its optimality to reductions of the group. The other side of the coin is the
robustness of its non-optimality to extensions of the group. That is,
(P.9) (i) lf SMR is optimal in group ~y, then it is also optimal in any odd-member
subgroup of N.
(ii) tf SMR is not optimal in group N, then it is also not optimal in any group
cuntaining N.
The necessary and sufticient condition for the optimality of the SMR. (3b), requires that,
W~ t WZ t... f Wn-I S Wn.l t... t Wn .
2 2
Each element on the left hand side of the inequality is larger than each element on the right
hand side of the inequality. Since the number of elements on the right hand side is n}1 and
2
since the number of elements on the left hand side is n-1 , it must be the case that the sum
2
of any two elements on the right hand side is larger than any element on the left hand side
of the inequality. It is straightforward to show that this implies (i). The proof of (ii) is
easily obtained using the reverse inequality (see Paroush and Karotkin (1989)).16
(P.9) (i) implies that an optimal SMR is immune to absenteeism. That is, if 2m members
are absent, 1 s m s n-1 . there is no need to reconsider the procedure for making group
2
decisions as SMR remains optimal in the reduced group.
(P.9) (ii) implies that extending the group and, in particular, adding to the group less
qualified individuals can never justify the employment of SMR if originally some other rule
is optimal. 'Quantity without quality' cannot justify the employment of SMR.
I Indrr ~umpl~lc inability uf dccisional skills veritication, the SMR has another special
and aplkaling property:
(1'.10) [Jnder complete inability of verifying decisional skills, the SMR is the best rule; it
maximizes the expecteci probability of making the correct collective decision.
Interestingly, this result is valid independent of the available information regarding the
characteristics of the distribution of individual decisional skills. For a three-member group
this result is established in Nitzan and Paroush (1984a). Gradstein and Nitzan (1986)
contirmed the result for n ~ 10. The general justification for the use of SMR under such
circumsttlnces for any group size is provided in Karotkin (1992c). This special advantage
of thc SMR is due to its symmetry in tenns of the assignment of decisional effectivity to the
group memhcrs and, in turn, to its nonvulnerability to the inability of verifying the individual
decisional skills; even if decisional skills were verifiable this would not have caused any
change in the assignment of weights as these are equal.17
5.2 Are there "special" r~nkings of WMR~s~
The fact that, regardless of group size and of individual decisional skills, one of the
R.11R'.c is al~~ays thc wurst ruk. (P.6) implies that there is asymmetry among rankings of the
WMR~s by their performance in the sense that some of these rankings are not feasible. (P.~.
might be the tip of an iceberg and the question is can the iceberg be exposed? Put
differently, is there a special pattern which is consistently (for any p) followed by the
rankings of WMR~s according to their decisional quality? Such a pattern has been identified
for small-member groups (~r S 5) (.ce~ Karotkin et aL (1988)). The existence ofan essential
~irderinR ovrr thr eftirirnt WMR~.c in a five-member group implies that less than 200
rankings are feasible uut of the 5040 - 7! possible rankings of the seven WMR~s." A
gcneralization uf this tinding is a worthy task. We conclude our essay by making a partial
step in this direction, namely, by establishing another general restriction on the feasible
rankings of the efficient WMR~s.
(P.I I) If the expert rule is the optimal WMR in an n-member group, then in the second-best
rule all decision makers are essential. More specifically, the second-best rule is defined by
the weights (n-2,1,...,1).
In othcr words, in an organiz.~tional environment precluding a first-best nile associated
with cxtremc wnccntrauun ufilrcisiunal clfcctivity, namcly thc cxislence ul a single esu:nUal
decision maker, allowing just three, four, five, etc. essential decision makers is always
inferior to allowing essentiality of ali n group members.18
To provc (P.ll), note that two WMR~s are different if they result in a different
collrctivc choice for at least une decision protite. Since WMR~s are neutral(y f E(WMR~
and yx, J(.Y) - ~-x)), two different WMR~s yield different collective choices for at least
two decision protiles, xo and -xo. If the two rules differ only over xo and -xo the
difference in the likelihood of obtaining the correct colleetive decision by the [woWMR~s
is equal to ~pr(x~ - Pr(-x~~. 1f one of the two rules is the expert rule, then it can be
easily veritied that x' -(1,-1,...,-1) is the solution to the problem
min ~Pr(x) - Pr(-x) ~ .
I'his implic~ Ihat Ihr ~rrimd hr~l rulr tn thc exprrt rulc is that WMR that diffcn from the
cslx~rl rulc unly uvrr .Y' and -x'. I'he nurm:dited w~ights dclining this rule are
(n-2,t,...,t). 't'he number of csscntial decision makers corresponding to this rule is n, which
proves (P.11).
6. Summary
We pointed out two aspects of the interdependence among the individual optimal
decisional effectivities. Specitically,
(1'.1) Tlie essentiality of a decision maker may be due to the presence of more competent
or less competent decision makers in the group.
(P.2) A wmmittee applying a SMR which is obtained by using the sequential pair-selection
proccss is path dependcnt.
We considered three types of monotonicity and showed that,
(P.3) The optimal number of essential decision makers dces not necessarily increase when
decisional skills become more egalitarian.l9
(PA) If inember ( is more competent than member j, then i's marginal effect on the
decisional quality of the group is higher than or equal to that of j.
(P.5) T~~o equally skilled valuable individuals are not better than one. T'hree or more are
bctter than one. In general, reinforcement of a group with valuable members need
not increase its performance.
Within our symmetric group decision-making setting asymmetry is manifested by the
existcncc uf "special" rules and rankings of rules. Specifically,
(1'.6) I:ur a given ilistributiun of decisional skills the worst potentíally optimal W1yR is
always a RMR.
(P.~ Given a particular decision profile, the collective choice is invariant to WMR
sclrchon if it is invarian[ to RMR selection.
(P.8) Given a particular decision protile, a potentially optimal WMR can result in a
collective choice which is different than the choice of any other potentially optimal
WMR, if and only if it is a RMR.
(P.9) (i) If the SMR is optimal in some group, then it is also optimal in any of its odd-
member subsets.
(ii) lf the SMR is not optimal in some group, then it is also not optimal in any
~xtcnsiun ufthe group.
(P.lo) Under complete inability of verifying decisional skills, the SMR is the best tvle; it
maximizes the expected probability of making the correct collective decision.
(P.I 1) If the expert rule is the optimal WMR in an n-member group, then in the second-best
rule all decision makers are essential.20
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Footnotes
l. fhis .antr~t is unl~ruhlrmati~ sincr :~n uptimal c~~llrctive decision rule always exists.
For morc general fnmeworks of organizational decision making or decision making in
teams based un the recugnition that "to err is human" and thus errors must be aggregated
in an optimal way, .~c~~~ Gradstein and Nitzan (1988), Heiner ( 1988), Nitzan and Paroush
(1985), Sah (1991) and Sah and Stiglitz (1985), (1986), (1988).
3. In the current synnnetric version of the uncertain pairwise choice model [he two
alternatives are assumed to be a priori equi-probable. Also the benefit (loss) associated
with a correct (incorrect) choice is assumed to be independent of the particular
alternative correctly (incorrecdy) chosen. If decision making costs are disregarded, then
the solution to our problem is also the solution to the problem of maximizing the
expected benetit of the group (see Nitzan and Paroush (1982), (1984b)).
4. For ~~ ~ 1. hy (3b), the SMR is the optimal WMR. By (3c), after the substitution of
one of the decision makers the optimal WMR for the expanded (n . 1) member group
is a RMR of order rt. But this rule is in fact a SMR applied within an n-member
group containing an individual with a reduced decisional skill. Clearly then the
performance of the original group is reduced.
5. Karntkin and Nitzan (1992a) also provide sufficient conditions for the neutrality and
inferiority of a substitution of a single individual by M less competent ones.24
6. Note that the optimal rule which maximizes the a priori probability of reaching a correct
collective decision given the individual decisional competencies also maximizes the a
postrriuri probability that the correct decision was reached given the decision profile of
the group.
7. A WMR is called efficient if the weights are ordered by decisional skills, that is, ( ~ j
implies ,,, ~ w.. Of course, a potentially optimal WMR must be efficient.
8. The cssential ordering has a number of interesting applications (see Karotkin et al.
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